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Christian Dustmann 
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This paper analyzes savings behavior and migration decisions o f temporary 
migrants. Special attention is given to the impact o f a stochastic environment 
on the migrant’s choice. The paper emphasizes two aspects which are likely to 
explain to some extend the relatively high savings o f migrant workers: savings 
due to life cycle motives, and savings due to precautionary motives. Furthermore, 
the impact o f uncertainty about future income on the migration decision as such 
and on the time the migrant wishes to stay in the host country is analyzed. The 
results show that the effect o f uncertainty on the time the migrant intends to stay 
abroad is ambiguous. It depends not only in sign, but also in size on the utility 
structure o f the migrant worker as well as on characteristics o f the economies of 
host- and home country.
*1 would like to thank Peter Hammond, Dorothea Herreiner, John Micklewright and Oded Stark 






















































































































































































A  m ajor form  o f intra-European m igration and m igration into Europe, but also o f  intra- 
Asian m igration and m igration between Asia and countries o f the M iddle East, is ’’ guest 
worker” , or, m ore generally, return migration. T he im pact o f this form  o f  migration 
on the econom ies o f both  the labor-exporting country and the labor-im porting country 
difFers in many aspects from  that o f permanent m igration. In contrast to permanent 
migrants, tem porary migrants invest a large proportion o f their earnings either into 
savings in the host country, or they transfer it to their hom e country, where it is 
then saved or used to support family members. Both the amounts o f m oney that 
are transferred back hom e and that are saved in the host country have im portant 
im plications for the econom ies considered. For the em igration country, transferred 
m oney is a m ajor balance o f payment support.1 For the im migration country, transfers 
contribute largely to  the balance o f payments deficit.2 On the other side, savings 
o f migrants in the host country provide a substantial part o f the dom estic savings 
o f im m igration countries and contribute to their capital form ation (M acm illan, 1982, 
p .251)3.
Despite the im portance o f m igrant’s consum ption- and savings behavior, there 
has been surprisingly little theoretical research on this topic. One difficulty when 
dealing with this subject is that earnings not used for consum ption in the host country 
are not necessarily saved; they are partly used to support family members in the home 
countries. On the other side, earnings that are transferred to the hom e countries are
Bn 1973, transfers from Turkish and Yugoslav workers in Germany amounted to over twice the 
total exchange obtained through exports of goods from these countries to Germany (Hiemcnz and 
Schatz, 1979, p.l). Over the period from 1960 to 1984, transfers of Greek workers from Germany to 
Greece amounted to 16% of Greece’s capital goods exports over that period (Glytsos, 1988, p.525). 
Transfers from Thai workers in the Middle East in 1981 were equivalent to about 6% of the total value 
of exports from Thailand in that year (Pitayanon, 1986, p.273). Remittances of Pakistanis from the 
Middle East finance some 86% of Pakistan’s trade deficit (Robinson (1986)).
2For instance, transfers of migrant workers from Germany to their home countries amounted to 
40% of the total deficit of the German account of services and transfers with foreign countries (Monats- 
berichte der deutschen Bundesbank, 1974, p.22).
3Jones and Smith (1970) report that the local savings rate (earnings that are invested into savings 
in the host country) of migrant workers in Great Britain in 1965 was about 2% above UK average. 
For France, the average local savings of foreign workers in 1970 was 50% higher than those of a French 




























































































not entirely consum ed, but to a large part invested into savings. There is a confusing 
use o f concepts in the literature: W hile official data usually refer to all foreign exchange 
o f migrants to the hom e countries as remittances, it would be  wrong to conclude that 
all such transfers are com pletely consumed by family members. A large part o f these 
transfers are saved in the hom e countries.4 On the other side, it would be similarly 
wrong to  interpret all earnings that are not consumed as savings, since a part o f it 
is used for the support o f  family members. Following Paine (1974), remittances will 
here be  used in the m ore narrow sense o f earnings that are used to support family 
members. Savings are then all earnings that are saved at hom e and abroad5. The 
strict differentiation o f incom e that is not consumed in the host country into savings and 
remittances is im portant for analytical purposes. W hile remittances are best analyzed 
in a fam ily context (see, e.g., Lucas and Stark (1985)), for the analysis o f savings 
behavior an individual approach seems m ore appropriate.6
One aim o f this study is to explain why migrant workers have a different savings 
behavior than native workers. T he analysis isolates two m otives which are likely to 
explain to some degree differences in the savings rates o f migrants and natives: life cycle 
m otives and precautionary m otives. T he extent to which life cycle m otives account for 
the excess savings o f migrants, relative to com parable native workers, is shown to 
depend on the wage differential and the relative price level between host- and home 
country, the m igrant’s preference for consum ption at hom e, and the desired length of 
m igration. T he analysis further reveals that the extent to which precautionary savings 
o f migrants are higher than those o f com parable natives depends on the m igrant’s utility 
structure, the perceived degree o f risk o f the labor markets o f host- and hom e country 
and the correlation between the effects o f som e events on the econom ies considered.
A further focus o f the analysis is the im pact o f uncertainty about future income 
streams in both , host- and hom e country, on the desired length o f m igration and, in the 
lim it, on the m igration decision itself. T he results show that no general conclusions are 
possible. Contrasted with a certain environment, uncertainty influences the m igrant’s
4Monatsberichte der deutschen Bundesbank, 1974, p. 275
5According to Paine (1974, p. 103), only survey data allow for such a differentiation. For Turkish 
workers abroad, Paine calculates for 1971 an average saving rate of 36% of total income. A further 
11% was used to support family members. These numbers indicate that savings net of remittances 
are still surprisingly high.





























































































choice. However, it ’s effect depends not only in size, but also in sign on the m igrant’s 
utility structure, on the riskiness o f  the host country labor market, relative to that o f 
the hom e country, and on interdependencies between the effects o f external shocks on 
both econom ies.
T he next section will first introduce the theoretical framework. It will then be 
shown how the wage differences in hom e- and host country, preferences for consum p­
tion at hom e as well as uncertainty with respect to future earnings m ay influence the 
m igrant’s savings behavior. As a point o f reference, m igrant’s savings behavior will be  
com pared with that o f native workers. T he second part o f the analysis concerns the 
im pact o f  uncertainty on the m igrant’s decision to m igrate and on the length o f his 
stay abroad. Results are then illustrated with a numerical exam ple.
2 Saving and Migration Decisions
Let the m igrant worker be confronted with the following decision problem : At some 
point in tim e, he has to  decide whether he wants to  migrate to a potential host country 
and for how  long. He further has to  decide about his future path o f  consum ption. 
A n  im portant m otive for m igration would be  a higher rental rate on a unit o f  human 
capital stock in the potential immigration country. T he worker would then migrate 
when the econom ic advantages o f doing so outweigh the cost o f m igration, or, following 
Sjaastad (1962), when the present value o f the migration decision is positive. This is 
also the classical explanation for labor m obility: As Hicks (1932, p.76) pointed out, 
’’ ...differences in econom ic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main causes 
o f  m igration.” However, it implies that the worker’s objective is only to m axim ize 
lifetim e incom e: his decision would solely be  influenced by m onetary aspects. Should 
this be  the case, and once having decided to migrate, is there any reason for the worker 
to  return to  his hom e country? In other words, is such a sim ple m odel capable to 
explain tem porary m igration? Obviously not, or only under certain assum ptions on 
the process o f  human capital accum ulation, and the evaluation o f human capital, in 
both countries.7
A sim ple extension o f the m odel would be to let the potential migrant m axim ize 
lifetim e utility from  consum ption, given a lifetime budget constraint that depends on




























































































the m igration decision. W hen the m igrant prefers to consume at home than abroad 
(because o f other arguments that are com plem entary to consum ption, like being to­
gether with his family and friends, living in a used environm ent, enjoying the climate 
etc.), his optim al decision may now be to migrate only temporarily, although the value 
o f the stock o f his human capital is higher abroad.8 T he reason for this is that, since 
his lifetim e is finite, each unit o f tim e spent abroad increases his lifetime utility by 
raising his total consum ption possibilities, but it decreases lifetime utility by reducing 
the tim e available for consum ption at home.
2.1 The Basic Model
Let the lifetime horizon o f the migrant be equal to T  =  1 and assume, for simplicity, 
that the worker is productive over his entire life cycle. T he migrant will have to choose 
the tim e t he wants to stay in the host country, thereby determining the time (1 — t) 
he will afterwards stay in his hom e country. The m igrant’s ob jective  is to maximize 
utility from  consum ption. Let his lifetime utility function be additively separable with 
respect to hom e- and host country consum ption, with the subutility functions being 
increasing in consum ption, strictly concave and continuously differentiable. Assume 
that the rate o f tim e preference and the interest rate are both equal to zero. This 
does not change any qualitative results o f the analysis that follows, but it implies that 
the flows o f consum ption in host- and hom e country are both constant. T he m igrant’s 
lifetime utility may b e  expressed in the following simple form:
V {c ‘ ,c E) =  tu , (cI) +  { l - t ) u E(cE) (1)
where u1 and uE are the subutility functions in the im m igration- and the em igration 
country9, and cl and cE are the respective constant flows o f  consum ption. A  higher 
preference for consum ption at hom e corresponds to a higher marginal utility from 
consuming an equal consum ption flow k in the hom e country: u,E(k) >  u,J(k ).10
8The trade off between higher wages in the host country on the one side, and a higher preference 
for consumption at home on the other side was firstly formalized by Djajic and Milboune (1988).
immigration- and emigration country will be alternatively referred to as host- and home county.
10iA(c^) and uE(cE) could likewise be expressed as tt(c* , G) and u(cE, F), where G and F are indices, 
representing environmental factors like family, friends etc. When G and F are complementary to c1 
and cE, respectively, (in the sense of Pareto and Edgeworth, see Hicks (1979), p.44), and if additionally 




























































































Total future earnings in host- and hom e country are given by t/ 7( /,  x ) and yE( t , z), 
where x  and z  are random  variables with known joint density function f ( x , z ) .  These 
random  variables could be interpreted as indices which reflect the im pact o f uncertainty 
on future incom es in host- and hom e country.11 T he variances o f x  and z will be 
denoted by and <7̂ , respectively, and the covariance between both by axz. The 
following assum ptions seem to be natural:
y{ >  0; y f  <  0; y'x >  0; y f  >  0 (2)
This sim ply implies that total earnings accumulated in either country are the higher 
the longer the migrant will stay.12 If interpreting x  and y as indices o f labor market 
conditions, the signs o f the last two terms are self explaining: the m ore favorable the 
state o f  the world, the higher will be total earnings, keeping t constant.
T he m igrant’s budget constraint is then given by the following expression:
t p c 1 +  [1 - t ] c E +  r) =  y '( t ,x )  +  yE(t ,z )  (3)
where p is the price level in the host country, relative to that in the home country, and 
77 are fixed costs o f m igration. Rewriting (3) yields:
cE =  Y Z -t [yI( t ,x )  +  yB( t , z ) - r i - t p c 1} (4)
Inserting (4 ) into (1 ) and adopting the von Neumann - M orgenstern hypothesis o f 
expected utility m axim ization, the individual will solve the following problem :
<t>(c\t) =  m a x E (V (c ',cE)) (5)
t,c‘
A ccordingly, the m igrant will choose the level o f consum ption abroad, c 7, and the tim e 
t to  stay in the host country so as to m axim ize expected lifetim e utility.
Since any uncertainty will not be resolved before t and c 7 are chosen, the following 
restriction has to  be  im posed on the m igrant’s total consum ption in the host country:
11 For instance, when risk affects income in a multiplicative form, then y1 =  y1 (t)x  and yE =  yE(t) z, 
where y1 and yE are total incomes in home- and host country as functions of t.
12Because lifetime is finite and t signifies the time being in the host country, an increase in t will 





























































































tpc1 < [y'(t,s) + yE(t,z) -  7/] (6)
where x  and z are the m inimum  levels o f x  and z. Relation (6) sim ply states that total 
consum ption in the host country has to be lower than total lifetime earnings when the 
m ost unfavorable states o f the world should realize.
T he first order conditions for an interior m aximum are given by:
<t>, =  E lu '(c ') -  uE(cE)\ +  E =  0 (7-a)
<j>c t =  £ [ u ' V )  -  p u E(cE)\ =  0 (7-b)
Relation (7-a) im plicitly determines the optim al length o f stay in the immigration 
country. T he optim al t will be chosen so as to equalize the expected marginal loss in 
overall utility o f  staying one unit o f tim e longer in the host country with the expected 
marginal gain o f staying one unit longer abroad, both  measured in units o f utility.
Expression (7 -b) sim ply states that the expected marginal rate o f substitution 
between consum ption at hom e and abroad has to equal the relative price level.
Type 1 and Type 2 Uncertainty
Incom e uncertainty that affects the m igrant’ s decision problem  may be due to unfore­
seeable future events that influence labor markets, and therefore earnings, o f host- and 
source country. It m ay also be due to  im perfect knowledge about the labor market 
conditions in the host country. B oth types o f uncertainty have different characteristics 
and m ay have different consequences for the m igrant’ s decisions. T he first kind o f un­
certainty will further b e  referred to  as type 1 uncertainty. T he latter type is denoted as 
type 2 uncertainty. T he analysis below  relates solely to type 1 uncertainty. Implications 
o f type 2 uncertainty will b e  pointed out later.
Some exam ples for type 1 uncertainty would be unforeseeable changes in raw 
m aterial prices, like an oil crisis, wars, worldwide econom ic downturns, political unrest 
etc. For this type o f  uncertainty, it seems appropriate to assume that, the longer the 
migrant intends to stay in either country, the stronger will be the im pact o f som e shock 




























































































by assuming that y'tx >  0 and yf2 <  O.13 In other words, marginal total incom e at hom e 
and abroad, which are earnings per unit o f time, increase in x  and z respectively.14 This 
is what Levhari and W eiss (1974) call increasing risk and implies that the variability 
o f total incom e, accum ulated in either country, increases with the tim e being in that 
country. Increasing risk would correspond to  a m ultiplicative specification o f the effect 
o f  uncertainty on earnings, as it is usually assumed in the literature on uncertainty 
and investment into human capital (see, for example, Eaton and Rosen (1980), K odde 
(1986)).
The Deterministic Case
Reconsider the m igrant’s optim ization problem  in a determ inistic world. Assume, 
therefore, that x  and z  are known to  be  equal to their expected values: x =  /?(.;•) =  x 
and z  =  E (z)  =  z. It then follows for (7-a) and (7-b):
[uE(cE) -  u7(c ') ]  =
u '7(c7) =  pu'E(cE)
f  l‘ - ‘ l ( 8-a)
(8 -b)
T he system  (8-a), (8 -b ) determines the optim al time to be  spent abroad, t°, and the 
optim al level o f consum ption in the host country, c10. For an equal price level in both  
countries (p =  1), and expressing a higher preference for consum ption at hom e by 
a higher marginal utility o f a constant flow o f consum ption k in the hom e country, 
u'E(k) >  u '^k), it follows from  (8-b) that the optimal level o f consum ption at home 
is higher than the optim al level o f  consum ption abroad: c£0 >  c ,a. Throughout the 
analysis, it will be assumed that the m igrant has a higher preference for consum ption 
at hom e, which ensures an interior solution for the time spent abroad (corresponding 
to  tem porary m igration). It follows then from  (8-a) that he will decide to migrate 
when the increase in lifetime utility from  staying one unit longer abroad is at least as 
high as the decrease in lifetime utility by  being deprived o f  the possibility to consum e 
during this unit o f  tim e at home.
For completeness, consider the case where the m igrant is indifferent between 
consum ption at hom e and abroad. This would correspond to u'^k) being equal to
13Note again that an increase in t decreases the time being in the home country, so that yt <  0.





























































































u,E(k ), and, consequently, c /0 =  cE0 and u \ c10) =  uE(cE0). T he m igrant’s decision will 
now depend solely on earnings prospects at home and abroad - the classical explanation 
for m igration. For an equal price level in both countries (p =  1), and indifference 
between consum ption at hom e and abroad, (8-a) reduces to
u'B(cE)[y\ +  y f }  =  0 (9)
M igration m ay now be perm anent, temporary, or the migrant may be indifferent be­
tween m igrating or not m igrating, depending on whether, for all f £  (0 ,1 ), + y f )  >  0, 
(vt +  v f  ) <  0) or (Vt +  v f )  =  0, respectively. An interior solution evolves when there 
exists a t°, t° £  [0,1], for which (y { +  y f )  =  0. In A ppendix 2 it is shown that this may 
well be  the case when human capital, accum ulated in the host country, is only earnings 
effective in the hom e country. In this special case, tem porary m igration m ay evolve in 
a determ inistic environment, although the migrant is indifferent between consum ption 
in either country and although he bases his decision on purely m onetary criteria.
2.2 Savings of Migrants and Natives
There are a variety o f explanations why individuals accum ulate savings. People may 
save because life tim e profiles o f incom e and desired consum ption do not coincide. Sav­
ings are thus a means to transfer consum ption over time. Savings o f  this kind are said 
to be due to life cycle m otives. A  further reason to save are precautionary m otives. 
Precautionary savings are induced by uncertainty about future incom e streams. Indi­
viduals save to  have funds for future contingencies. Savings m ay also be due to bequest 
m otives. Savings would here be a means to provide capital for children or other heirs.
T he following analysis will concentrate on the first two m otives. It will be shown 
that both , savings that are due to life cycle m otives, and savings that are due to pre­
cautionary m otives, m ay differ considerably between migrant workers and com parable 
natives.
Life Cycle Motives
In simple intertem poral m odels, savings that are referred to as life cycle savings occur 
when the individual’s rate o f tim e preference differs from  the interest rate. Individuals 




























































































than the interest rate. In the present m odel fram ework, the interest rate and the 
rate o f  tim e preference are both  assumed to  be equal to zero. Accordingly, there is 
no difference between both  rates which could induce savings. Since the purpose is to 
com pare savings o f  migrants and natives, this restriction translates into the assumption 
that savings induced b y  such a difference are equal between migrants and natives. W hat 
remains are life cycle savings that accrue because profiles o f  lifetime incom e differ from  
profiles o f  lifetime consum ption. It will be shown that this m ay be m ajor reason why 
migrants have a different savings behavior than native workers.
Consider a m igrant worker w ho’s decision problem  is characterized by the above 
optim ization problem . His earnings prospects abroad are higher than those at home. 
However, he prefers to  consum e at hom e rather than abroad. His savings in the host 
country that are due to life cycle m otives consist then o f two com ponents: first, holding 
the flow o f consum ption constant over the life cycle, he will save because earnings are 
higher abroad than at hom e. Secondly, holding the incom e stream constant over the 
life cycle, he will save because desired consumption is higher at hom e than abroad.
Before form alizing these arguments, a native reference group has to be charac­
terized. Define therefore a comparable native as one who m aximizes lifetime utility 
over the same horizon T  and who has the same path o f human capital accum ulation 
as the m igrant worker. Furthermore, since the native lives in his hom e country, let 
his lifetime utility function be equal to  the subutility function o f the m igrant worker 
in the em igration country. Assume, for simplicity, that both  migrant and native have 
a constant stock o f  human capital over the horizon T. Denote earnings per unit o f 
tim e in the em igration- and the immigration country by wE and w1, respectively, with 
wE <  w1. Accordingly, migrant and native receive equal earnings in the im m igration 
country. T he total savings rate s is given by:
How would this savings rate differ between native and m igrant, when both were ob ­
served at the same point in tim e during the m igrant’s stay abroad? T he lifetime budget 
constraint o f  the native worker corresponds to tw 1 +  [1 — t] w ' =  c ‘ . Given his utility 
function V N =  t u! (cr) +  [1 — t ]u / (c / ), he will choose a constant c1 over his life cycle 
that is equal to w1. Consequently, his savings rate is equal to zero.15




























































































T he m igrant’s budget constraint is, according to (3 ), given by t w1 +  [1 — /] wE =  
t c 1 +  [1 — t)cE. Neglect any fixed costs o f m igration (rj =  0). T he m igrant’s savings 
rate sM consists then o f  two com ponents, savings that are due to discontinuities in his 
life cycle incom e stream ( s ^ )  and savings that are due to discontinuities in his stream 
o f desired consum ption (s£*):
sM =  s f  +  s f  = ■ [ ! - < ]  +,  -i —  ( 10)w' w ‘
T he rate s^  is positive whenever w1 >  wE: in this case, future earnings will decrease. 
Life cycle earnings o f the migrant are lower than those o f the com parable native, 
although they both  have equal earnings in the im migration country. T he prospect o f 
lower future earnings would then induce the migrant to accum ulate savings.16 17 The 
share o f s™ in the total savings rate depends on the size o f the wage differential and 
on the length o f the desired m igration period.
Additionally, migrants m ay save because they have a preference for consum ption 
at hom e. T he corresponding savings rate is given by . Savings are accum ulated to 
allow for an increase in the flow o f consum ption upon return. T he share o f in the 
total savings rate depends on the extent o f m igrant’ s preference for consum ption at 
hom e and, again, on  the length o f the tim e abroad. The size o f depends additionally 
on the price level abroad. Should the price level be higher in the immigration country 
than in the em igration country (p >  1), it follows from  (8-b) that the migrant would 
further reduce consum ption abroad, relative to consum ption at home. Consequently, 
a higher price level in the immigration country would reinforce the size o f s ;)1.
Consequently, when m igration is intended to be tem porary,1' life cycle motives 
may induce migrant workers to  have savings rates that are higher than those o f com ­
parable native workers. T he total rate o f savings o f a m igrant worker is the higher, the 
larger the differential between wages at hom e and abroad, the stronger the preference 
for consum ption at hom e and the higher the relative price level abroad. T he savings 
rate decreases with the length o f  migration.
excluded by assumption.
16This is essentially the motive for savings that is analyzed by Galor and Stark (1990). For wages 
being lower in the home country, Galor and Stark illustrate in a two-period model that migrants 
savings in the first period are the higher, the higher their return probability in the second period.
17The analysis would also include the case where migration is desired permanent (because a prefer­
ence for consumption abroad), but is restricted being temporary (because legal restrictions, like e.g. 





























































































T he second explanation for a different savings behavior between migrants and natives 
are precautionary motives. In what follows, the m igrant’s optim al savings- and con­
sum ption decision in the host country under small uncertainty about future incom e 
will first be  com pared with that under certainty. It is then shown that precautionary 
savings o f m igrant workers are likely to be higher than those o f com parable native 
workers.
Let t° and c10 be  the optim al length o f stay and the optim al level o f consum ption 
in the host country, when x  and z  are known to be equal to their expected values 
x  =  E (x )  and z =  E (z ). In other words, t° and c10 solve (8 ). T o com pare the 
optim ally chosen level o f consum ption in the deterministic case, c /0, with that chosen 
under small uncertainty, expand (7-a) around x  =  x  and z — z. Neglecting terms o f 
order higher than 2, and assuming that yE and y1 are linear in x  and z, respectively, 
this results in the following expression (derivation see A ppendix 3):
jy - ^ 2 u'"E(cE)[V a r(yE +  y ‘ )} (11)
where E °(.) =  E (.)  when z — z and x  =  x. It follows from the second order condi­
tions that <j>ci ci <  0 (see A ppendix 1). Accordingly, d £7°(ti/ / ( c / ) — u'E(cE))/dcI <  0. 
Therefore, the optim ally chosen level o f consum ption in the host country under small 
uncertainty is smaller or larger than that chosen in the certainty case, depending on 
whether the term  on the right hand side o f (11) is negative or positive, respectively. 
Since V  ar(yE +  y ')  will always be positive, the sign o f the term on the right o f (11) 
depends on the sign o f u"'E(cE), indicating the change in the attitude towards risk 
when cB changes. W hen u"'E{cE) =  0, the optim al level o f consum ption is not affected 
by uncertainty. This is, for instance, the case for a quadratic utility function.
However, for u'"E(cE) >  0, it follows from  (11) that c,a > c1, where c '  is the 
optim al level o f consum ption when small uncertainty about incom e at hom e and abroad 
is present. It is easy to show that u"'E(cE) has to b e  positive when absolute risk aversion 
is decreasing and the utility function is additively separable (see Leland (1968) )1S If 
the m igrant’s utility structure exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, he would, 
under small uncertainty, accum ulate precautionary savings and increase the level o f 18
18For an extensive discussion of the properties of the third derivative of the utility function and its 




























































































consum ption in the hom e country even if he were indifferent between consum ption 
at hom e and abroad. T he interesting question that arises is whether precautionary 
savings o f migrant workers differ from  those o f com parable natives.19
It is obvious from  (11) that the im pact o f uncertainty on the savings decision 
depends on the size o f V ar(yE +  y1), the variance o f lifetime incom e. V ar(y,:i +  yl ) 
may be rewritten as:
V ar(yB +  y ')  =  V ar(yE) +  V a r(y ')  +  2 C ov(yE +  y1) =  \y^o\ +  y B2o\ +  2pyIxy fa x<rz\
( 12)
Accordingly, the variance o f the m igrant’s lifetime incom e consists o f the variance of 
total incomes in the host- and in the source country, both depending positively on the 
tim e spent in either country, and on the covariance between both. T he degree o f risk 
exhibited by the respective labor market may be measured by erf, i =  z ,x .  Assume 
first that the random  variables x  and z are uncorrelated.
T he variance o f lifetime incom e o f a migrant worker, and, accordingly, his pre­
cautionary savings, m ay then be higher than that o f a com parable native worker for 
two reasons: the variance o f incom e to be accumulated in the host country is higher 
than that o f  the native worker, or /an d  the variance o f incom e to be  accum ulated at 
hom e is higher than that o f the native worker, both  evaluated over the same period 
length t.
First consider V a r(yI), the variance o f total incom e to be  accum ulated abroad. 
Evaluated for the same t, V ar(y! ) is higher for migrant workers than for com parable 
natives if migrants perceive the host country labor market as m ore risky than native 
workers. It is likely that this is the usual case. For instance, in m any im migration 
countries m igrant workers do not have the same rights in the labor market or the same 
benefit entitlements than native workers. Furthermore, discrim ination may prevent 
migrant workers from  having the same opportunities to stay in the jo b , or to find a 
new jo b , especially during econom ic downturns. T he variance o f lifetime incom e for 
a m igrant worker would then be higher than that o f a native worker, given that the
19Since the analysis of precautionary savings requires at least a two-period framework, assume, as 
before, that the life of the comparable native is divided into two periods of unequal length, period 1 
corresponding to t and period 2 to (1 — t). Comparisons of savings of migrant workers with those of 




























































































variance o f incom e in the hom e country over the remaining period [1 — f] is not lower 
than that o f the respective native worker over that period .20
Secondly, higher precautionary savings o f migrants may be induced by the desired, 
tem porary nature o f m igration. If the migrant stays only tem porarily in the host 
country, and, after return, enters the labor market o f the hom e country, the variance 
o f his lifetime incom e depends on the riskiness o f the hom e country labor market. 
Em igration countries are often characterized by poorly  developed benefit system s.21 
T hey usually exhibit fairly high rates o f unemployment, low stability and are sometimes 
highly sensitive to  econom ic shocks. Therefore, the variance o f the m igrant’s incom e 
to be accum ulated after return may b e  high, thus further increasing the variance o f 
lifetime incom e, respective to  that o f a com parable native worker.
Furthermore, the correlation between the effects o f  som e shocks on the labor 
market o f  em igration and im m igration country may well be positive or negative. In 
this case, not only the variances o f yE and y 1, but also the covariance between yh and 
y1 determines the size o f V ar(yE +  y l ). A  positive correlation between total incomes 
to be  accum ulated at hom e and abroad would signify that the same type o f event has 
either a positive or a negative effect on  labor markets and earnings in both countries. 
A  negative correlation would correspond to opposite effects on labor markets in the 
two countries.
Assume, for instance, that the em igration country is a net im porter o f som e raw 
materials, e.g. crude oil, while the immigration country is a net exporter. A r ise in 
oil prices would then have a positive effect on the econom y o f  the im m igration country 
and a negative effect on the econom y o f the emigration country. On the contrary, if 
both econom ies were net im porters o f crude oil, a rise or fall in oil prices would affect 
both  econom ies similarly.
20The variance of total income to be accumulated in the host country should he particularly high for 
illegal migrants. They usually do not have the right to claim any benefit support in the host country. 
Furthermore, their illegal status prevents them from appealing to any labor market law that concerns 
minimal wages or job security.
21 Although institutionally established benefit systems are often less developed in potential emi­
gration countries, it would be wrong to conclude that migrants are always better off in immigration 
countries. Less economically developed emigration countries have very often a well-functioning, non- 
institutionalized benefit systems that is based on kinship and family. While the migrant worker may 
rely in his home country on family support in the case of unemployment or illness, he may end up 




























































































T he correlation o f the effect o f  such an event on labor markets and, accordingly, 
earnings is captured by  the correlation coefficient p in (12). W hen p =  0, total incomes 
in the two countries are uncorrelated. Should p <  0, som e shock would have opposite 
effects on the two econom ies. This allows the migrant to hedge against risk. For 
a negative correlation, there exists an optim al level o f  consum ption and an optim al 
length o f tim e abroad so that all risk would be removed from  the m igrant’s decision 
problem . A ccordingly, the correlation between the effects o f some random  shocks on 
the labor markets, mirroring characteristics and interdependencies o f the economies 
considered, m ay weaken or reinforce the size o f precautionary savings.
Consequently, when the utility structure o f migrants exhibits decreasing absolute 
risk aversion, migrants are likely to accum ulate precautionary savings that are higher 
than those o f com parable natives. T he size o f savings that are due to precautionary 
m otives depends on the perceived riskiness o f  the host country labor market and the 
hom e country labor market, determining the variance o f  total earnings in either country, 
and on the length o f m igration. It further depends on the correlation o f the effects o f 
som e shock on labor markets in both countries.
2.3 Uncertainty and Migration Decisions
Uncertainty does not only influence m igrant’ s savings in the host country, as was shown 
above, but also his optim al length o f stay abroad and, when analyzed around 1° =  0, 
the m igration decision itself. To investigate the effect o f incom e uncertainty on the 
optim al choice o f  f, denote t° and c /0 as those realizations o f t and c1 which solve the 
m igrant’s decision problem  when x  and z  are known to be  equal to their expected 
values. Expanding (7-a) around x =  x  and z =  z, and assuming that y r and y E are 
linear in x  and z, respectively, results in the following expression (for the derivation 
see A ppendix  3):
£ ° [ u V )  -  « ( c B)] +  E° 
1 1
u'E(cE)
d c ? . .
^ r [1 ~ <!
A 1 =
2 [1 -  f]2
u '"E (c E ) d̂ _ +  u „E (cE) 
at
t A 1 +  A 2 =  A  
[Var(yE +  y l )\
(13)




























































































where E°  again indicates that the expectations are evaluated at x — x  and z  =  i .  For 
<t>it <  0 (see A ppendix 1), the term  on the left decreases in t. As a result, the optim ally 
chosen level o f  t under small uncertainty, t, is smaller or larger than that chosen in the 
determ inistic case, t°, depending on whether A  is smaller or larger than zero:
Uncertainty affects the optim al choice o f t directly and indirectly. D irectly because the 
migrant is risk averse. Indirectly because a change in i changes the variance o f total 
lifetim e earnings, and, by way o f altering c®, changes the attitude towards risk. T he 
direct effect o f risk aversion and the indirect effect via a change in the degree o f risk 
aversion are captured by A 1. T he indirect effect via a change in the variance o f total 
lifetim e incom e is captured by  A 2.
Consider first A 1: since Var^y1 +  yE) >  0, the sign o f A 1 depends on the sign o f 
U" /£ (CE) further depends on the m agnitudes o f u"'E(cE) [dcE/dt] and u"E(cE). For a 
given variance o f total lifetime incom e, u"E(cE) captures the direct effect o f  uncertainty 
on the choice o f t. T he term  u"'£ (cE)[dc® /dt] represents the indirect effect by a change 
in the attitude towards risk, caused by a change in desired consum ption at hom e, cE, 
that results from  a change in t.
Given the structure o f  the problem , decreasing absolute risk aversion would im ply 
that >  0. Accordingly, for dcE/dt =  [y{ +  y f  — c1 +  cE] >  0, an increase in t
would, by  way o f increasing the flow o f consum ption in the hom e country, increase the 
willingness to accept some given risk and influence the length o f  migration positively. 
However, since the direct effect is negative (u"E(cE) <  0), the sign o f A 1 is am biguous.
T he second indirect effect is induced by the im pact o f a change in t on the variance 
o f  total lifetim e incom e. This effect is captured by the term A 2. Since u"E(cE) <  
0, the sign o f  A 2 depends on the sign on d V a r(yE +  y')/dt. W hen, for som e f°, 
d V a r(yE +  y ! )/dt <  0, an increase o f the tim e being in the host country will reduce 
the variance o f  total lifetime incom e. This would be the case when, for instance, the 
labor market o f the hom e country is very risky, relative to that o f the host country.




























































































Table 1: Changes in the Variance o f Lifetime Incom e (| ^Var^y1 +  y B))
CORR (0 <  <° <  1 ) c II O
P = ~ 1 b f  -  y f  <7,1 b f ,  °x  -  yf, <^] y f b f , -  yf, °x}
>or<o >0 <0
>o?<ooII b f y f , ° l  +  y f y f ° f \ y f  yf,
>0 <0 <0
>or<o
p =  1 b l  +  y f  0z\ +  b L  +  yf, <rz] y f b f , +  yf,
>0 >or<o >or< o
________________>or<o______________
o f stay abroad. This can directly be seen from  (13): For d V a r(yE +  y ! )/dt <  0, and 
u"E(cE) <  0, A 2 >  0. A ccordingly, should A 1 >  0, or ( A 1 +  A 2) >  0, it follows that 
i >  t°.
T he sign o f d V a r(yE +  yr)/dt depends on the degree o f risk in the respective 
labor markets, as represented by ax and Uj, and on the correlation between the random 
variables x  and 2 . For p =  —1, p =  0 and p =  1, the first column in table 1 presents 
[1/2] d V a r(yE +  y , )/dt when the solution o f the determ inistic problem  is an interior one 
(0 <  t° <  1). T he second colum n o f table 1 gives d V ar(yE +  y')/dt when the solution 
o f  the determ inistic problem  would be  t° =  0 (i.e. the objective function reaches it ’s 
m axim um  for t° =  0). W ithout further specification o f y 1, y E and the distribution 
o f x  and 2 as well as the m igrant’s utility function and the incom e functions in both 
countries, it is ambiguous whether A 2 will tend to have an increasing or a decreasing 
effect on  the tim e spent abroad, com pared with what would have been chosen under 
certainty. In other words, depending on the migration situation and the preference 
structure o f the migrant worker, uncertainty m ay have a positive or a  negative effect 
on the tim e the migrant intends to stay abroad.
T he effect o f A 2 is m ore definite when the m igration decision itself is considered. 
Neglecting the effect o f A 1, colum n 2 o f table 1 shows that uncertainty with respect to 
future incom e would induce the migrant to m igrate, even if he would not do so under 
perfect foresight, when x  and z  are negatively correlated or not correlated. This is due 





























































































A sim ple numerical exam ple m ay help to illustrate the above arguments. Assume the 
m igrant’s utility structure to b e  o f the following sim ple form:
However, when x and z  are positively correlated, the effect o f A 2 on the migration
decision is again ambiguous.
u(c') =  G c 'o s ; » (cE) =  F ceo's
where F  and G  are indices which capture environmental arguments, like family, friends 
etc. T he utility function has the property that u'" >  0. Let F  >  G, and norm alize by 
setting < 3 = 1 .
Assum e that total earnings in host- and home country, y 1 and yE, are linear in x 
and z, as well as in t and [1 — <]:
y1 =  w1 1 x  ; yE =  wE [1 -- <] z
Again, wl and wE denote earnings per unit o f tim e in im migration and em igration 
country.
Assum e som e numerical values. Suppose that wE =  1, w' = 2  and F  =  2. 
A ccordingly, wages in the host country are double as high as in the hom e country. 
Further, let the price level between host- and hom e country be equal (p =  1), and set 
the fixed costs o f m igration to  zero (y =  0).
W hen the random  variables x  and z are known to be equal to their expected 
values, and expectations are equal to unity (E (x ) =  E (z) =  1), the optim al flows o f 
consum ption at hom e and abroad and the optim al length o f migration are given by the 
following numbers:
Consequently, the m igrant would intend to spent 1 /6  o f his future life abroad. His 
consum ption per unit o f  tim e abroad would only be 1 /4  o f  what he plans to  consume 




























































































SM =  s f  +  3 ?  =  0.416 +  0.416 =  0.83
In this sim ple exam ple, the m igrant would intend to save 83% o f his wage incom e.
Consider now the case o f  uncertainty. Let the random  variables x  and z have 
means o f unity, variances <r2 and cr2 and covariance <jx az p.
Three situations will be  exam ined. In situation 1, the migrant perceives the labor 
market o f  the hom e country as riskier than that o f the host country. In situation 2, 
the opposite is the case: the migrant considers the host country labor market as riskier 
than that o f  the hom e country .22 In situation 3, the host country labor market is 
likewise riskier than that o f the hom e country, but the difference in the degree o f risk 
is smaller. T he following values will be  assumed:
• Situation 1: ax =  0.5; <rz =  0.8
• Situation 2: <rx =  0.9; az — 0.3
• Situation 3: ax =  0.8; <r2 =  0.5
In all situations, the migrant will accum ulate precautionary savings, since u"'(.) >  
0. For the assumed utility structure, the effect o f uncertainty on the desired length 
o f  m igration depends on the riskiness o f the two labor markets, as well as on the 
correlation between the effects o f som e event on them . Table 2 presents qualitative 
results for d V a r(y ! +  yE)/dt, A 1, A 2, and A 1 +  A 2.
In situation 1, a further stay abroad would increase the variance o f lifetime incom e 
(Var^y1 +  y E))  for p =  1. It would decrease the variance o f lifetime incom e for p =  0 
and p =  —1. In situation 2, an increase in t increases the variance o f lifetime incom e for 
all p's. In situation 3, the variance rises likewise, except for p =  — 1. T he direct effect 
o f  risk aversion and the effect o f a change in the degree o f risk aversion on the optim al 
length o f  m igration, as represented by A 1, is positive in all situations and for all p’s. It 
therefore affects the desired tim e abroad positively. However, A 2, which captures the
22Note that the labor market of the host country may exhibit a different degree of risk for the 
migrant than for the native worker. The degree of risk depends on the extent to which the foreign 
labor market is discriminative against migrant workers, the migrant’s legal rights to claim benefit 




























































































Table 2: The Impact of Uncertainty on Migration Decisions
C o R R dVar(yr Hh yE)/dt A 1 A 2 A 1 +  A 2
S i t u a t i o n ( i ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 ) (3) ( 1 ) (2 ) (3 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
P =  1 ( + ) ( + ) ( + ) ( + ) ( +  ) ( + ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( +  ) ( - ) ( - )
P =  o ( - ) ( + ) ( + ) ( +  ) ( +  ) ( + ) ( + ) ( - ) ( - ) ( +  ) ( - ) ( + )
P =  - 1 ( - ) ( + ) ( - ) ( + ) ( + ) ( + ) ( + ) ( - ) ( + ) ( + ) ( - ) ( + )
effect o f a change in the total variance o f  lifetime incom e on the optim al t, is negative 
in situation 1 for p =  1. It is negative for all correlations in situation 2. In situation 
3, it is again negative for p =  1 and p =  0, but positive for p =  —1 . Sum m ing up A 1 
and A 2, the total elfect o f uncertainty in situation 1 would be  to increase the length o f 
the m igration period, com pared to what would have been chosen under certainty. In 
situation 2 , uncertainty has a decreasing effect on the desired length o f stay abroad. 
Finally, in situation 3, the effect is negative for p =  1 and positive for p =  0 and
p =  - 1 .
This exercise should have dem onstrated that incom e uncertainty affects the m i­
grant’s desired length o f  stay and, in the lim it, the m igration decision itself. However, 
the effect is not conclusive without specifying the m igrant’s optim ization problem  ex­
plicitly. Depending on the m igrant’s preference structure, the specification o f  the in­
com e functions and the distribution o f and correlation between the random  variables x  
and z, uncertainty may increase or reduce the desired tim e in the host country, relative 
to that chosen under certainty.
2.4 Type 2 Uncertainty
So far, only the im pact o f type 1 uncertainty has been analyzed. A dditionally to type 
1 uncertainty, type 2 uncertainty may influence the m igrant’s decision problem .
W ith  type 2 uncertainty, the potential migrant is before m igration uncertain about 
how the foreign labor market evaluates his abilities and his stock o f  human capital. 
However, once arrived in the foreign country, he will gather inform ation about the 
requirements o f the labor market and thereby reduce uncertainty.




























































































when there is an established and long-lasting m igration relation between target- and 
source country. Returners m ay have thoroughly inform ed new potential migrants about 
the im migration country .23 However, for the first wave o f m igrants, type 2 uncertainty 
may play a m ajor role in the decision process. W hich kind o f uncertainty finally dom ­
inates, depends on the m igration situation under consideration. Although both types 
o f uncertainty are likely to affect the m igrant’s optim ization problem  simultaneously, 
the effect o f  type 2 uncertainty on the decision variables will be  analyzed separately.
Since type 2 uncertainty only affects earnings abroad, assume earnings at home 
as certain. Define f  as the random  variable that reflects uncertainty which is due to 
im perfect knowledge about the foreign labor market. Let g ( ( ) be the known density 
function o f £, with variance <rj. Future incom e abroad is then given by 5r ( f , f ) .  Given 
that the stock o f knowledge about the foreign econom y rises while the migrant stays 
abroad, an increase in t should reduce uncertainty that is due to im perfect knowledge.
It therefore seems to be reasonable to adopt the assumption o f decreasing risk yj^ <  0.
Consider first precautionary savings: the variance o f  total lifetime incom e, V ar(yE+  
y 1), reduces to  j/ | 2 er2, which is always positive. Accordingly, uncertainty that is due to 
im perfect knowledge w ould likewise induce the migrant to accum ulate precautionary 
savings.
To analyze the effect o f type 2 uncertainty on the length o f  m igration, one has 
to evaluate A 1 and A 2. T he sign o f A 1 is again am biguous. T he sign o f  A 2 depends 
on d V a r(yE - f y 7) /d t , which reduces to d V a r(y l )/dt =  y^cr^y ,̂. This term is always 
negative since yi decreases in t. Accordingly, and neglecting the effect o f A 1, the 
effect o f A 2 alone would then always be to increase the tim e to be  spent in the host 
country. This is a direct result o f decreasing risk when uncertainty is due to imperfect 
inform ation.
3 Conclusion
T he aim o f the above analysis was twofold: First, to analyze the motives that may 
be responsible for the surprisingly high saving rates o f m igrant workers. Secondly, to 
investigate the im pact o f  uncertainty with respect to future incom es on the migration
23An example would be migration of turkish workers to Germany during the early seventies, after 




























































































decision and the length o f tim e the migrant intends to stay abroad.
T he analysis isolates two m otives which m ay explain to som e extent why tem po­
rary migrants often have savings that are considerably higher than those o f com parable 
native workers: life cycle m otives and precautionary m otives. Savings that are due to 
life cycle m otives are likely to be higher for migrants than for native workers. The 
difference between saving rates is the greater, the larger the wage differential between 
hom e- and host country, the stronger the m igrant’s preference for consum ption at home 
and the higher the relative price level in the immigration country. It decreases with 
the length o f m igration.
T he m igrant m ay further accum ulate precautionary savings. For uncertain fu­
ture incom e flows in hom e- and host country, the m agnitude o f precautionary savings 
depends on the size o f the variance o f future incom e. It is shown that this variance is 
likely to  be larger for migrants than for native workers. In particular, precautionary 
savings are likely to be higher for migrants when foreigners can not claim  the same 
rights in the labor market o f the immigration country than native workers, when the 
labor market o f  the host country discriminates against foreign workers, when the mi­
grant has an illegal status, and when the labor market o f the hom e country exhibits a 
high degree o f risk and instability, leading to a high variance o f incom e to be accum u­
lated after return. These effects are reinforced by a positive correlation between the 
im pact o f  som e random  shocks on the labor markets considered, and weakened by a 
negative correlation.
T he effect o f  uncertain future incom e on the migration decision and the length 
o f the m igration period is inconclusive. It depends on the specification o f the utility 
structure and the incom e structure o f the migrant. It further depends on the perceived 
degree o f  risk exhibited by both  labor markets and the correlation between the im pact 
o f random  shocks on labor markets in both countries considered.
Uncertainty affects both  the decision to migrate as well as the desired length o f 
stay. T he analysis shows that this effect is generally am biguous, not only in size, but 
also in sign. A ccordingly, conclusions for one migration situation, and for one type o f 
migrant m ay be inappropriate when another migration situation and another type o f 
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Appendix 1: The Sufficiency Conditions
Let ip(cJ ,t ,x ,z )  =  tu I(cI) +  [1 — t\uE(cE) for any x, z defined over the range (x , x) and 
(z, z ), where x , z and x, z are the lower and upper limits o f the distributions o f x and z, 
respectively. Then it follows for ipci ci :
VVc' =  tu " ‘ (c1 ) + P2 u"E (cE ) (14)
and for iptt
V>1( =  [1 - t ] u " E{cE)
d £ f'
dt
u'E(cE) Ç  + u'E(cE)[y ‘tl +  yE] (15)
ipci ci is definitely negative. iptt is smaller than zero for y1 and yE being concave in t. However, 
when y1 and yE are convex in £, as it would be the case when human capital accumulation is 
allowed for (see Appendix 2), then iptt <  0 iff |[1 -  t]u"E(cE)[dcE/ dt]2 -  u,E(cE)[dcii'/df]| > 
Iu'(cE)[ylt+2/^11- That this is the case will be assumed throughout the analysis. Furthermore, 
iptci =  — pt u"E(cE)[dcE/dt\. It follows that ipci ci iptt > ^ 2C/- Since ip is concave in c7, t for 
all x , z, the same must be true for (p =  E (V (ce , c7)).
Appendix 2: Changes in the Stock of Human Capital
The functions o f total income abroad and at home, y1 and yE, may well be nonlinear in 
t. To see this, consider the deterministic case and denote by yJ(t) and yE(t) total earnings 
accumulated at home and abroad, respectively. Let v1 be the rental rate on one unit o f human 
capital stock abroad and vE be the rental rate on one unit at home. Assume the accumulation 
o f human capital as exogenous and as independent o f whether the migrant stays abroad or at 
home. Denote the stock o f human capital in t by h(t), with h'(t) > 0,h"(t) < 0 . The strict 
concavity o f the human capital stock is in line with human capital theory and compatible 
with empirical evidence [see Dustmann (1990, 1991)]. Denoting t as the point of re-migration, 
total lifetime earnings are then given by w:
w(t) =  y1(t) -F Vs (t) =  J  v1 h(r) dr +  J  vE  h (r)dr (16)
Specify, for instance, h(t) as [h(t) =  7  +  t0 5]. Inserting in (16) and solving yields:




























































































wt = [v1 -  vE] [7 +  t0 5] (18)
Equation (18) is positive for v1 > vE. The profile of w is then a strictly convex function of t:
wtt =  0 .5 [v7 -  vE]t~05 > 0  (19)
An interesting case to consider is now the following: the migrant accumulates human capital 
while being abroad. In the host country, he does not receive a higher pay for this additional 
human capital. It increases, however, his potential earnings in the home country. In other 
words, the additionally acquired human capital is only earnings effective back home.
Such a situation could occur if the migrant has no occupational choice in the host 
country, or he may by purpose accumulate human capital that is only o f use later in the 
home country. In such a situation, migration may be temporary, although the migrant is 
indifferent between consumption at home and abroad and although initially wages are higher 
abroad.
To see this, assume the extreme case: let the migrant accumulate human capital abroad, 
but only get paid for this additional stock o f human capital back home. For the above 
specification o f the human capital function, lifetime income is then:
w(t) =  J  j v 1 dr +  J  vE [7 +  r 0 5] dr (20)
and
Wt = y{ +  y f  =  7 [v1 -  VE} -  VE i0'5 (21)
For this specific example, migration would be temporary if there exists a t 6 [0,1] that solves 
Wt =  0, i.e. when {7  [v1 -  vE]/vE} 2 =  t* and 0 < f* <  1 .
Appendix 3: Derivation of equations 11 and 13.
A second order expansion o f (8-a) around x = E (x ) =  x and z =  E(z) =  2 , and neglecting 
higher order terms, yields:
Each additional unit of time spent abroad increases lifetime earnings by wt = y[ + yE:




























































































+h  “Æ(c£) [z _ z] + \  h ?  u'E(cE) [x~ i ] i+ \ ~ h  u'E(cE) [z ~ ~z]2
f> x 6 z
u'E(cE)[x -  x][z -  z\ | f (x ,z )d x  dz (22)
where all derivatives are evaluated at x =  x and z =  z. When assuming that y1 and yE are 
linear in x and z, respectively, (22) simplifies to:
E° [u'7(c7) -  u 'E(c£ )] «  u "(c,0) -u 'E(cE0) - ^  ~ ^ u " \ c ) [ y ?  o l+ y E2 o ]+ 2  p y i y f  axaz]
(23)
Expanding Var^y1 +  yE) around the mean values o f x and 2 yields (for linear risk):
Var(yr + yE) = Var(y! ) + Var(yE) +  2C ov(y', yE) ss [y£ al +  y f 2 a\ + 2py'x y f  (24) 
Substituting into (23):
£ W )  -  »'E(cE)) ~  « ' V ° )  ~ u'E(cE0) -  \ [V«r(yE + y')\ (25)
Since the first order condition o f the deterministic problem requires that u'1 (cI0) — u,E{cE0) =  
0, ( 1 1 ) follows directly from (25).
The derivation o f (12) follows the same lines:
u'E(e?°)
E°[u/ (c / ) -  uE(cE)\ +  E° 
dcE ~
; u'(c10) -  uE(c,a) +
dt
6 z
[i «1 + r r {
J—oo J—oo I
n'E(cE) ^ - [ l  - t ) - u E(cE)
u'E(cE) 7 T [1 ~ - “ B(cE)
- « V ]  [ * - * ] *  +
r -, 1 62
[Z —Z ] + 2 S *
ulE(cE) ~ [ l - t ]  - u E(cE)
6 x6 z u'E(cE) t1 -  - uE(cE)
[x — x] [z — z] > / ( x ,  z) dx dz (26)




























































































After some tedious calculations, (26) simplifies to:
E°[uI(cI) - u h (ct )\ +  E° u'(c‘ a) -  uE(cEa) +
u'E(cE°)
'r fc f '
di [1 -  <] + è 12 [1 -  t]* u">E{cE) -~ -  + u"B(cB) at [y’x2° l  +  +  îvlvz°*A
+ ÿ f  ÿfiff2 +  [î/rfÿf +  2/f(!/xbr*](27)
It follows from (24):
j t V ar{yE +  y ')  =  2 [yf ^,<rj +  y f  ÿgff* + [y ',y f  +  yEy ’x\oIZ\ (28)
Again, it follows from the first order conditions o f the deterministic problem that u7(c /0) +  
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